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Saikewicz:
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetents
Harold F. Gamble, Ph.D.

The author is a member of the department of philosophy at St.
Louis Community College, Meramec. He noted that the comments of
Norman Fost, John Robertson, Carl Wellman and Daniel Wikler
greatly improved this article.

Should we provide chemotherapy for leukemia for Joseph
Saikewicz, an incurably ill, elderly, severely retarded resident of a
state institution, whose life may be prolonged for up to a year by such
care? The case of Superintendent of Belchertown v. Joseph
Saikewicz,l which discusses this question, seems destined to become a
classic for debate among lawyers, physicians and philosophers. 2
I find the decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
which affirmed the probate court's decision not to treat Saikewicz,
open to speculation. First, I question that the number of considerations for nontreatment exceeded the considerations for treatment. I
examine and reject some of the court's considerations for nontreatment, and argue that the court overlooked a consjderation for treatment. Secondly, I doubt that the substituted judgment doctrine, a
procedure which the court used to discover Saikewicz's wishes, was
rigorously applied. Finally, I argue that the court did not establish a
criterion for determining when life is worth living for Saikewicz.
Hence, the court had no decision procedure for deciding Saikewicz's
fate when there were an equal number of considerations for and
against treatment.
A. Saikewicz's Situation
Joseph Saikewicz was a 67-year-old, profoundly retarded (I.Q. of
10 and mental age of approximately two years and eight months),
long-term inmate (54 years) of state institutions in Massachusetts.
Although he could not communicate except for gestures and grunts
and responded only to gestures and physical contact, Saikewicz
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enjoyed good health until April, 1976, when doctors learned he had
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia - a fatal cancer of the blood.
The superintendent of Belchertown State School, where Saikewicz
had resided for the last 48 years, petitioned the probate court for a
determination about medical treatment. Treatment would involve the
use of powerful drugs to kill not only leukemia-affected cells, but in
the process, normal body cells as well. Because of massive, indiscrim inate, blood-cell destruction, the onset of chemotherapy usually
makes the patient much sicker. Side effects of treatment include
nausea, vomiting, bladder irritation, numbness and tingling of the
extremities, and hair loss. Finally, even if successful in inducing a
remission, chemotherapy does not cure the underlying disease, and so
after a period of two to 13 months, the leukemia usually returns and
kills the patient.
Although there was medical controversy as to whether Saikewicz's
age would impair the effectiveness of chemotherapy, facts before the
court indicated that Saikewicz had a 30 to 40 percent chance of
remission. 3 The court also noted that chemotherapy would require
the cooperation of Saikewicz over a period of several weeks and this
raised speculation that he would need to be physically restrained
during treatment and constantly supervised. Finally, the court
remarked that Saikewicz was not presently in pain and within weeks
or months would die a relatively painless death without chemotherapy, but that such treatment would probably lengthen his life.
The court decided against treatment and Saikewicz died in September,
1976, from bronchial pneumonia, presumably a complication of his
leukemia.
B. Substituted Judgment Doctrine

Since the court modeled the legal treatment of an incompetent
patient after that of a competent one, and competent patients have
the right in appropriate circumstances to refuse medical treatment,
Saikewicz also had a right to refuse medical treatment. The court
construed its decision for non treatment as being what Saikewicz
would have done in an exercise of his right to privacy and self-determination. But, of course, Saikewicz himself could not have made a
decision to refuse treatment, because he was incompetent. The court
resorted to the substituted judgment doctrine to solve this difficulty.
The substituted judgment doctrine is the court's attempt to "don
the mental mantle of the incompetent" and "to substitute itself as
nearly as may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same
motives and considerations as would have moved (the incompetent). " 4 Using this doctrine, the court tried to place itself in
Saikewicz's position and act as he would if he were competent to
make decisions about his medical care. In doing this, the court had to
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consider how Saikewicz would act while knowing that he would live
out his life as an incompetent. In other words, the court tried to see
Saikewicz's situation through his eyes as an incompetent, if competent
to assess his situation, and this necessitated taking into account his
continuing incompetency. There is no presumption that Saikewicz
must be subjected to what rational and intelligent persons decline,
since this placed a lesser value on his life. Evidence that most people
would accept chemotherapy had no direct bearing on Saikewicz's case.
While I have no criticism of using the substituted judgment doctrine, I question whether the court rigorously applied substituted \
judgment to Saikewicz so that it viewed considerations about nontreatment from his perspective. In my discussion of the arguments
against treatment and in presenting an additional argument for treatment, I present examples of the lack of rigor in applying substituted
judgment.

c. Arguments Against Treatment
In arguing against treatment, the court listed six factors favoring
nontreatment and two favoring treatment. It concluded that the
weight of the evidence favored nontreatment. As reasons against
chemotherapy for Saikewicz, the court listed : (1) his age, (2) his
inability to cooperate with the treatment, (3) probable adverse side
effects of treatment, (4) low chance of producing remission, (5) th e
certainty that treatment would cause immediate suffering, and (6) the
quality of life possible for him even if the treatment did bring about
remission. 5 Of these six factors, only (2), Saikewicz's inability to
cooperate with treatment, and perhaps (6), quality of life judgment
which the court interpreted to mean the continuing pain and disorientation subsequent to chemotherapy, were particularly relevant to an
incompetent. As considerations favoring treatment, the court listed
(1) the chance that his life might be lengthened thereby, and (2) the
fact that most people in his situation, when given a chance to do so,
elect to take the gamble of treatment. 6 While I do not dispute the first
and sixth considerations for nontreatment, I have questions about the
others.
First, the list of reasons for nontreatment is redundant. Consideration (3), probable adverse side effects of treatment, includes (5), the
certainty that treatment will cause immediate suffering. Immediate
suffering is just one of the adverse effects of treatment, not some new
category.7 There are, then, only five distinct considerations for
nontreatment.
By (4), the court meant to say that Saikewicz had a 30 to 40
percent chance of remission. The court imported a value judgment
into this consideration when it called a 30 to 40 percent chance of
remission low. There is nothing wrong with this value judgment except
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that I see no acco mpanying argument justifying the application of
" low " to this remission rate. These figures are low in the sense t hat
they are less than 50 percent, but higher than if the remission rate
were 10 to 15 percent. The judgment one m akes about these figures is
also a function of whether or not one is afflicted with the disease.
Until the court gives an argument why such figures are a reason for
n on treatment, it is unclear that they count as evidence for
non treatment.
Consideration (2) against treatment was that Saikewicz would have
been unable to cooperate with chemotherapy. This means, the court
contended, that h e would have experi enced confusion , disorientation ,
have been unable to anticipate and prepare for side effects of treat.
ment, and consequ ently , would have suffered more from chem otherapy th an a competent patient. No real evidence was given, however, that Saikew icz's pain would have been worse than a competent
person's pain. While it may be true th at a person who understands the
reasons for pain is better able to endure it, it is possible that Saikewicz
would not have suffered more than a competent patient. Moreover,
since pain perception varies among individuals and may be related
only indirectly to incompeten cy and the factors which the court cited,
Saikew icz may no t have suffered unduly.
Good evidence about how painful treatment would have been for
Saikewicz could have been obtained from a trial treatment for his
leukemia. Treatment could have been stopped if he b ecame un controllable or uncomfortable. It sh ould also have been possible to sedate
him to red u ce or control pain which may have been intermittent. Such
a strategy would not have been cruel, particularly in view of the
court's fr equ ent m e ntion of Saikewicz as a unique individual and the
lack of good evidence that his pain would have been worse t han t hat of
a competent individual.
A d ecision on the part of Saikewicz to tryout chemotherapy also
would have been consistent with the substituted judgment doctrine.
Since h e had never been in this situation previously, he may have
reasoned that some experience with chemotherapy might make him
better able. to judge its risks and benefits. He could also have reasoned
that this d ecision was reversible since treatment could be stopped.
While a decision to begin a trial treatment requires additional discussion, the failure of the court to consid er this alternative demonstrated
a lack of rigor in app lying the substi tu ted judgment doctrine to
d eterm in e h ow Saikew i cz might have reasoned about his
circumstan ces.
But su ppose it were true that Saikewicz would have fared worse on
chemotherapy than a competent patient. What would such a comparison show, keeping in mind that the majority of competent patients
who are informed of the side effects of ch emotherapy, choose this
treatm e nt? If the majority of competent patients rejected such treat.
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ment (and we knew that Saikewicz would have fared worse than a
competent patient), then it is clear that we should not have subjected
Saikewicz to treatment. But given that competent patients choose
treatment, why should it have been a persuasive consideration for
denying Saikewicz treatment that he would have fared worse than
competent patients? This comparison tells us only the outcome of
Saikewicz's treatment relative to another group, but it does not tell us
how poorly - or how well - he would have fared. It is possible that
treating Saikewicz still would have been indicated, even though treatment would not have been as beneficial for him as for competent
patients.
Another problem with claiming that Saikewicz would have fared
worse on chemotherapy than a competent patient is that we have no
firm standard for the benefit of chemotherapy on competent patients,
except that the majority of competent patients choose it. With any
patient, a physician evaluates the benefit of chemotherapy by how
well a patient responds. And a patient does likewise. In many cases
chemotherapy is of questionable benefit, even for competent patients.
We need to remember, then, that the court drew a comparison
between something which is sometimes of questionable benefit
(chemotherapy for a competent patient) and chemotherapy for a
congenital incompetent. The question is, what can we learn from such
a comparison? I do not think that this comparison gives us good
evidence that chemotherapy would or would not have been beneficial
for Saikewicz. Therefore, it is not a satisfactory consideration for
denying Saikewicz chemotherapy.
I have argued that there were only three considerations for nontreatment of Saikewicz since (5) is a special case of (3). I have also
questioned (4) as a reason for non treatment, because the court
presented no argument t o justify the application of "low" to
Saikewicz's chance of remission. Finally, I disputed (2), a comparison
which claimed that Saikewicz would suffer more than a competent
patient. Thus there remain only three considerations for nontreatment
from the court's original list. Are there any additional reasons, other
than the two which the court listed, in favor of having treated
Saikewicz? There is at least one.
D. An Additional Reason for Treatment
An important consideration in favor of treating Saikewicz was that
the decision to treat was reversible, whereas the decision not to treat,
particularly with Saikewicz's leukemia where treatment had to begin
immediately for any hope of success, would be irreversible. Treatment
could have been discontinued if Saikewicz had shown avoidance
behavior or behavioral signs of severe pain and stress. For example, if
there was always a struggle when nurses cane to take him for treat-
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ment, it could have been concluded that he was suffering unduly and
treatment could have ceased. As I suggested earlier, beginning treatment would have shown respect for Saikewicz and his individual situation and given him an opportunity as best he could to express himself
to us.
Many may argue that a trial treatment of Saikewicz would have
created difficult problems and it should not have been considered.
Presuming that treatment would not set in motion irreversible sideeffects and biological processes in Saikewicz, there may still remain
, objections. First, how much pain and suffering, on substituted judgment of Saikewicz, was too much so that treatment should have been
ended? Second, did treatment create aesthetic problems? Third, did
beginning treatment of Saikewicz make it more difficult to stop when
it was no longer in his interests?
In answering questions about how much pain and suffering justifies
ending treatment, we need to recognize that the measures for pain and
suffering are imprecise. Uncontrollable behavior by Saikewicz at the
sight of tubes and needles or the treatment area should have been
sufficient, however. "Uncontrollable behavior" means behavior which
cannot be managed by analgesics. The general issue here is when continued life is an injury to a patient. There is no positive duty to treat
when the prospects of continued life are poor and the amount of pain
and suffering is high.
In dealing with aesthetic considerations about treating Saikewicz,
we must remember that aesthetics may, but should not, cloud our
assessment of whether to begin treatment. For example, there is the
possibility that we may have to suspend a trial treatment and it feels
different to suspend treatment than never to begin. Additionally,
seeing an incompetent in restraints as intravenous tubes drip chemicals which cause toxic side effects would be dreadful. Saikewicz
was not the kind of patient who satisfied our need to be healers. The
emotional strains which such a patient places on doctors and nurses
are possibly greater than in the case of a competent patient. None of
this, however, is relevant to what might be the wishes of someone like
Saikewicz, if competent, or what might be in his best interests.
The final concern with beginning treatment is that we may mistakenly continue to treat someone like Saikewicz when it is no longer
in his interest. We may come to feel, for example, that we can justify
the previous pain and suffering of treatment only by continuing
efforts to treat. Having criteria for suspending treatment and understanding that continuing treatment may be an injury to a patient
should help to prevent a slippery slope. More important, however, to
argue that the possibility of making a mistake is a reason for not
beginning treatment would justify our never attempting any trial treatments. The objections to a trial treatment, then, do not seem persuasive.
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Adding the consideration that the decision to treat is reversible to
the court's reasons for treatment would give us three considerations
for treating Saikewicz. Earlier I had argued that there are only three
considerations for nontreatment. Although now there is an equal
number of considerations for and against treatment, there is additional
evidence which helps weaken arguments for nontreatment.
Saikewicz's familial, social and economic circumstances might have
made treatment less of a burden for him than for a competent, noninstitutionalized patient. Since Saikewicz's sisters chose not to become
involved when informed of his leukemia, Saikewicz may have reasoned
that prolonging his dying by chemotherapy would not have placed
emotional burdens on loved ones. Moreover, since he was a state ward,
he may also have reasoned that his treatment would not be a financial
burden to himself or his family, an important consideration for many
noninstitutionalized patients.
Additionally, since Saikewicz was institutionalized, his life was
simpler than the lives of many competent leukemia patients who must
severely restrict their activities. They also feel a deep change of body
image as skin tone alters and hair falls out. Saikewicz, presumably,
would not have felt these same restrictions of bodily activities, since
he had not engaged in many of the activities of competent patients
and it is doubtful that he would have anguished over a change of body
image. Again, these considerations do not indicate how well Saikewicz
might have done on chemotherapy. But by failing to consider these
unique features of Saikewicz's situation, the court not only neglected
to apply substituted judgment rigorously, but also neglected to see the
weakness of its arguments for nontreatment.
My analysis of the Saikewicz decision shows an equal number of
considerations for and against treatment. With this balance - and
probably even when the number of considerations is relatively close
for treatment versus nontreatment - the court's m,ethod of considering the weight of the evidence to decide Saikewicz's fate failed. What,
then, should have happened to Saikewicz?
I think a treatment decision needed to be made in terms of a
criterion for when Saikewicz's life was worth living. The Saikewicz
court lacked such a criterion and simply talked about the weight of
the evidence. This procedure works only when the evidence is unquestionably in favor of treatment or non treatment. Moreover, the consequences of error in assessing the nu mber of considerations for and
against treatment loom large when the numbers are close.
A proper criterion for treatment was that Saikewicz should have
been treated if, and only if, the benefits of prolonged life ou tweighed
the pain and suffering of chemotherapy. In assessing the burden of
pain and suffering we need to consider the familial, social and
economic circumstances as I earlier suggested. This criterion entails
that we should have ceased treatment if Saikewicz were having pain-
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behavior unmanageable by analgesics, when bad days began to outnumber good ones and there was little hope for more good future
days. If he were living a vegetative existence, maintained by tubes and
needles, and there was little prospect that he would ever live again
without such intensive care, then we should have found that the
benefits of prolonged life do not outweigh the pain and suffering and
ceased treatment.
E.Conclusion
While I do not think that the court's arguments supported nontreatment, my arguments do not claim without qualification that we
should have treated Saikewicz. In such cases, we should begin treatment, always being ready to stop when we think that the benefits of
continued treatment do not outweigh the pain and suffering of the
chemotherapy. Beginning treatment is an attempt to go between the
horns of the dilemma of either treatment or nontreatment and to give
the patient an opportunity to express himself to us as best he can.
Before closing, I would like to point out that I am not arguing in
this paper for or against the sanctity of human life nor for a position
that human life must be defended at all costs. I think there are many
instances where dying is preferable to living with a body wracked with
pain in the final stages of a fatal disease. But I do not see that
Saikewicz would have become this kind of patient or that we would
have needlessly maintained him with a trial treatment of chemotherapy.
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